Established in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), was initially aimed at fostering regional economic cooperation and disaster relief among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. It was revitalized in November 2017 at the ASEAN Summit in Manila, to refocus on addressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, particularly concerning China’s militarization and assertiveness. The QUAD serves as a platform for coordinating efforts among member nations to counterbalance China’s influence in the region and uphold a so-called free, open, and inclusive Asia-Pacific. The increasing militarization of QUAD can be a threat for peace and stability in the region that can disrupt economic activities in the broader Asia-Pacific region.
The U.S. views China as a revisionist authoritarian state aiming at undermining the post-cold war order. In response, the U.S. seeks to bolster its Asia-Pacific forces and secure ally support, as noted in the 2019 U.S. Indo-Pacific Security Strategy Report. The QUAD’s militarization, driven by perceived Chinese threats, has intensified bloc politics and U.S.-China tensions. In 2022, the QUAD launched a “Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative,” a cybersecurity partnership, and expanded cooperation in hypersonic technology, electronic warfare, and information sharing. The QUAD’s commitment to share satellite data with Southeast Asian nations, while humanitarian in purpose, could also facilitate defense information sharing and maritime monitoring, potentially leading to regional militarization.
Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, reinvigorated the QUAD to counter China’s regional influence, particularly regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. Since Japanese nationalization of these islands in 2012, China has challenged Japan’s control through incursions by fishing vessels, maritime militia, law enforcement vessels, and military aircraft. Tensions escalated when China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013. In response, Japan bolstered defenses around the Senkaku Islands and purchased 400 Tomahawk missiles. Japan’s National Defence Strategy emphasizes developing counter-strike capabilities and participating in the initial phases of the kill chain to address threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. Moscow’s increased military activities and coordination with China near Japan further complicate the security landscape for Japan
Abe’s 2017 announcement to exceed the unofficial defense spending cap of 1% of GDP marked a significant shift. This includes upgrading SDF ships for F-35B jets and reinterpreting Article 9 of Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow collective security measures and arms exports. Abe’s vision of a “democratic security diamond” among Asia-Pacific democracies underscores Japan’s commitment to countering the so-called Chinese assertiveness and ensuring freedom of navigation.
India takes the most advantage of QUAD, enhancing its strategic reach and furthering the objective of regional supremacy. As is well-known, India has territorial disputes with China, particularly along the un-demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC). China claims the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as ‘South Tibet,’ while India claims Aksai Chin as part of Jammu and Kashmir. India alleges that China is using ‘salami-slicing’ tactics – that involve gradually encroaching on territory through a series of small, incremental actions that are difficult to detect and respond to individually but they cumulatively result in significant strategic gains.
Australia views the South Pacific as its strategic domain but is concerned about China’s growing military presence, particularly in Vanuatu, through debt-trap diplomacy. To address this, Australia has aligned more closely with the U.S. and its neighboring states, negotiating with Papua New Guinea to develop a joint naval base on Manus Island, preventing potential Chinese involvement and bolster its own regional security. As a whole, this competitive dynamic between the West and its allies on one hand and China on the other creates a security dilemma, fueling mutual suspicion, an arms race, and military posturing, thus increasing the risk of miscalculation and conflict.
The QUAD’s commitment to share satellite data with Southeast Asian nations, while humanitarian in purpose, could also facilitate defense information sharing and maritime monitoring, potentially leading to regional militarization. Despite concerns over China’s militarization of the South China Sea, some Southeast Asian countries continue importing Chinese arms, including surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and advanced warships, highlighting the complexity of the regional dynamics. This intricate web of relationships underscores the strategic importance of Southeast Asian states in the broader Asia-Pacific security framework, making them pivotal players in the evolving power balance between the QUAD and China.
Further, QUAD members are engaged in several military exercises to demonstrate an integrated response to Chinese threats. The 2022 RIMPAC exercises, involving QUAD members and South China Sea nations, showcased their collective resolve against China’s growing influence. These maneuvers, possibly leading to a “Quad Plus,” include countries with competing claims against China like the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.
The MALABAR exercises, sponsored by India and involving the QUAD, are becoming more routine, including partners like the UK, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, France, and Bangladesh as observers. These drills, covering various military operations, have drawn criticism from China, which labeled the grouping as an Asian “NATO,” promoting Cold War dynamics and geopolitical rivalry.
QUAD members have strengthened bilateral and trilateral partnerships, conducted naval exercises and created bloc politics. Notable examples include the U.S.-Japan-ROK Extended Deterrence Dialogue, and significant drills occurred in the Indian Ocean, around Japan, Guam, and the Philippine Sea near the disputed Scarborough Shoal. The 2017 Indian Ocean exercises, involving U.S., Indian, and Japanese aircraft carriers, marked the largest naval drills in the region in two decades. India has signed foundational agreements with the U.S. (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA) and upgraded its relations with Australia to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020, including logistics support arrangements. The U.S. actively seeks defense agreements in the Asia-Pacific, pressuring other states to align with it. Conclusively, the QUAD’s militarization and use of critical technologies extend influence across South Asia, East Asia, and beyond, leading to a new great power competition between the United States and China. This aggressive maneuvering risks irreversible politico-military contestation and even war, prompting states to enhance offensive military capabilities. Such actions reshape regional and global geopolitics, affecting trade, sea lanes of communication, and economic activities. Increased security tensions and naval deployments may disrupt maritime commerce, raise insurance costs, and deter investment, hindering economic growth. Competition for resource exploration and strategic dominance could escalate conflicts over offshore deposits, complicating resource development and limiting regional growth prospects amid deepening geopolitical rivalries. The militarization of the QUAD not only heightens security tensions but also jeopardizes the economic stability of the Asia-Pacific region, creating a precarious environment for future prosperity.
Sibra Waseem
Sibra Waseem is pursuing undergraduate studies in Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad. Her areas of interest include geopolitics and military strategies.
