Modi’s third term can have significant implications for the future of Pakistan-India relations. After Modi’s electoral strategy of exploiting religious differences for political gains failed to attain the desired success, he will likely revert to another common tactic in the populist toolkit: leveraging nationalistic fervor against an external adversary. To better understand the future of Pakistan-India relations under Modi 3.0 it is important to see the historical context, the recent electoral outcome, and the geopolitical dynamics in which all the dynamics are intertwined and will play out.
The Pulwama-Balakot Crisis and the 2019 General Elections
In the Indo-Pak subcontinent, adopting an aggressive stance against the rival nation is a common strategy political leaders employ to boost their prospects. An example is the Indian rhetoric after the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis and its impact on the Indian elections. In 2019, just before the general elections, the Pulwama attack became a critical point of tension between two nuclear-armed neighbours. Modi responded to the attack by carrying out airstrikes inside Pakistan, which led to subsequent aerial dogfight that escalated the hostilities to the brink of a larger conflict. Inside India, the airstrikes bolstered Modi’s image as a strong, assertive leader committed to national security. His party won a landslide victory in the general elections that year, secured 303 seats out of 543—55.8% of total seats—and formed a comfortable majority in the parliament.
The same post-election Indian parliament abrogated Article 370 and 35A of the constitution, thus ending the special status of Kashmir. In response, Pakistan downgraded diplomatic and economic ties with the country, which hasn’t been restored since then.
The 2024 General Elections: A Shift in Strategy
However, in recent general elections, Modi changed his tactics. While many of his cabinet ministers doubled down on their rhetoric against Pakistan—with Rajnath Singh threatening to invade Pakistan to kill escaped terrorists and Amit Shah claiming that a re-elected BJP government would take back Pakistan Administered Kashmir—Modi’s primary focus was on domestic populist themes. He targeted the Muslim minority to exploit existing religious ruptures within the Indian polity. Modi’s strategy didn’t achieve the desired electoral success this time. Modi, who aimed to and claimed to secure 400 seats out of 543 during his campaign, couldn’t even attain a clear majority of 272 seats and got only 240 seats. Another way to put it is that the BJP lost 63 seats and secured only 44.2% of the total seat share.
Galwan Valley Debacle
A significant factor that will likely impact Modi’s posture towards Pakistan is the Galwan Valley debacle. Although unrelated to Pakistan, it badly dented Modi’s strong man image. The debacle compromised India’s national security and provided the opposition with the necessary ammunition to target the government.
The incident happened in 2020 when clashes erupted between Indian and Chinese soldiers in Ladakh over the construction of a road near the Galwan River. The clashes resulted in Chinese soldiers taking control of a chunk of Indian territory along the disputed frontier zone and the death of 20 Indian soldiers. The Indian National Congress party also declared that the 2020 clash represented the biggest setback to Indian national security in decades.
Though Indo-China clashes have subsided for the time being, China so far hasn’t withdrawn from the territory it captured. Pressure will build up on Narendra Modi to take any sort of action in the near-future for bolstering Indian credibility.
What Modi 3.0 entails for Pakistan?
To salvage his support base and revive his strong man image, Modi can again engage Pakistan in a crisis to divert attention from Chinese incursions. Despite his utmost efforts to appease Hindu hardliners by building Ram Mandir over Babri mosque with much fanfare, his party lost the very constituency where it built the temple. Modi’s strategy of exploiting local religious differences didn’t pay off. Moreover, the Galwan factor dented his image as a strong man, Modi will likely change tracks and focus on exploiting the nationalistic sentiments against external adversaries. For this purpose, Pakistan can again be targeted by India.
The historical pattern also shows that Modi can gain political traction from an escalation with Pakistan. So, it is likely that Modi 3.0 will double down on its rhetoric against Pakistan as a strategic measure. Furthermore, the recent cross-border assassination campaign carried out by India inside Pakistan, aimed at eliminating alleged terrorists living on foreign soil, and its open confirmation by the hawkish Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh indicates the course of future policy.
Factors Influencing Modi’s Policy Choice
In addition to domestic political interests and the Galwan factor, several other considerations will influence Modi’s foreign policy choice towards Pakistan. They include economic conditions, military and geo-strategic calculations, and Pakistan’s internal instability.
Domestically, the BJP faces a diminishing support base, as evident from the outcome of recent general elections. On the geostrategic front, India aims to counter Chinese influence in South Asia and seeks regional power. While, on the economic front, India under Modi is facing high unemployment and inflation rates, Modi has promised in his manifesto to make India the third largest economy by 2027.
Moreover, India’s recent aggressive missile tests, its advancement in Indigenous ballistic missile defence systems (BMDs), and its purchase and deployment along Pakistan’s border of the Russian S-400 missile defence system also means that India is preparing for gaining strategic advantage over Pakistan.
Another significant point to consider is the domestic instability inside Pakistan on political, economic and security fronts. While the economy is in dire straits, Pakistan’s major political parties are wrangling over electoral rigging and the mandate issue. TTP is resurging and undertaking terrorist regular attacks in Pakistan’s KP province.
In Balochistan, in addition to Baloch Insurgency, the Pashtun belt around border areas of Chaman is protesting against the state over its decision to set up single document regime on the border crossing. Meanwhile, the increasing friction with the Afghan Taliban adds another layer of complexity to Pakistan’s security situation.
Given all these considerations, Modi can use Pakistan’s vulnerability to his advantage for asserting India’s dominance. A confrontational posture towards Pakistan serves multiple purposes: it unites his base, distracts from domestic issues, and positions India as a strong power on the global and regional stage.
Conclusion
Modi’s third term is likely to see an increased reliance on hardline policies towards Pakistan. The confrontational posture will serve many strategic purposes for Modi, such as deflecting attention from domestic issues, domestic political consolidation, regional power assertion, reviving his image as a strong leader capable of safeguarding India’s national interests, and a clear message to both Pakistan and China about India’s defence capabilities and resolve. Considering the historical context and current dynamics, it is improbable that Indo-Pak relations during Modi 3.0 will see a thaw; instead, there’s a strong possibility of increased tensions and potential escalation.