Maritime Risk Misread?
In the aftermath of the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan, brief but intense, Indian strategic circles appear to have redrawn the conclusion that limited war below the nuclear threshold is still viable, additionally through the maritime domain. In my view, this is not just an operational adaptation, but a strategic recalibration that marks a shift in Indian doctrine, not just rhetoric. Former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari also echoed Pakistan’s concern that Islamabad perceives this situation as an expanding toolkit of Indian coercion, from dual-use supersonic cruise missiles to threats of weaponizing water flows under the Indus Waters Treaty, as part of a shift in India’s evolving strategy to achieve compellence by shifting domains from land to sea.
The conflict unfolded with a false flag operation in Pahalgam in Indian-occupied Kashmir, unfortunately resulting in 26 casualties. Within four days, active hostilities had ceased, but not before both sides had exchanged firepower, narratives, and signaling. What stood out this time was not just what was struck but what was said. India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh declared, “The Indian Navy will lead our response to any future Pakistani aggression… Our forces had not even started showing their might. We paused Operation Sindoor on our own terms.” This statement, in my view, marked a departure from previous land-based or air-based operations, such as India’s 2016 so-called “surgical strikes” or the 2019 Balakot air raids. Instead, it highlighted an emergent strategic preference for stand-off aggression through sea power.
From Pakistan’s perspective, India’s willingness to lean into naval options introduces new ambiguities and new risks, especially the assumption that escalation can be managed or contained below the nuclear threshold. If conventional deterrence breaks down, Pakistan’s thinking is not governed by kinetic volumes alone but by the meaning assigned to strikes, the targets involved, and the perceived intent behind them. In this context, maritime operations, no less than air or land campaigns, could escalate beyond any Indian limited objectives in waging a war from offshore platforms.
Indian Precision Confidence and Pakistani Skepticism
India’s maritime pivot appears rooted in a misplaced confidence both in its maturing sea-based second-strike capabilities and in what I consider precision warfare. This confidence has found explicit doctrinal expression. This confidence was later echoed in India’s post-crisis doctrinal remarks, suggesting a belief in wide maneuvering space below the nuclear threshold.
From my vantage point, this quote encapsulates a dangerous optimism that South Asia’s nuclear threshold is geographically fixed or spatially adjustable, and that escalation can be micromanaged through selective target choices. India’s doctrinal evolution seems to assume that dual-capable SLCMs, unmanned systems, and naval aviation assets offer flexible coercive tools, capable of producing compellence without provoking nuclear risk.
Read more: What’s in a Name? Strategic Signaling and the Semantics of India–Pakistan Military Operations
In Pakistan, such assumptions are viewed with deep skepticism. Deterrence is not defined by domain or distance alone. It is also shaped by perception, signaling, and target interpretation. A missile launched from sea that strikes a critical port, naval base, or dual-use node on the coast, such as Gwadar or Jinnah Naval Base, or elsewhere in Pakistan will not be assessed by its launch point, but by its impact on Pakistan’s strategic calculus.
Therein lies the core divergence. India sees escalation as modular; Pakistan sees it as relational. The strategic value of a target, the ambiguity of intent, and the cumulative nature of attacks matter more than the presumed “precision” of a strike. And when dual-capable platforms are used in a compressed geography with ISR saturation, the firebreak between conventional and nuclear rapidly narrows.
Projection or Provocation?
India’s naval activity in the North Arabian Sea during the May 2025 crisis was not symbolic, it was strategic signaling. Within 96 hours of the Pahalgam incident, Indian officials acknowledged the deployment of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG), marking a rare public operational disclosure. In my view, this was not mere projection of force; Pakistan read it as an assertive shift from defensive maritime posture to forward maritime coercion.
India’s Western Fleet, based in Karwar and Mumbai, includes the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, BrahMos-equipped Kolkata-class destroyers, Shivalik-class frigates, Scorpène-class submarines, P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, and MiG-29Ks. From India’s perspective, deployment Western fleet may reinforce deterrence and offer layered options short of general war. From a Pakistani lens, this deployment was interpreted not as a neutral posturing, but as a coercive operational shift. It redefines escalation geometry: sea-based coercion can still violate deterrence thresholds if aimed at strategic targets or if it coincides with broader crises. If such order of battle is optimized for precision strikes and ISR-intensive missions, Pakistan’s responses may not be restrained.
The belief that the maritime domain allows for sanitized compellence, that it is inherently more controllable than air or land, is increasingly questioned in Islamabad. Indian escalation at sea may begin with engaging platforms, coastal infrastructure, economic lifelines like CPEC, and nodes like Ormara or Gwadar. However, considering these soft targets that may not elicit strong Pakistani responses would be poor deterrence logic.
BrahMos and the AI–Nuclear Ambiguity Spiral
India’s induction of BrahMos into its Strategic Forces Command (SFC) marks more than a technological milestone; it was a doctrinal signal wrapped in deliberate ambiguity. Though classified as conventional in much Western literature, BrahMos’ dual-capable architecture and integration into platforms like the Su-30MKI suggest strategic intent. Pakistan has long assessed BrahMos as nuclear-capable, particularly when deployed under the operational authority of the SFC.
During the May 2025 crisis, Indian media claimed that at least 15 BrahMos missiles were launched against Pakistani targets. If true, the posture signaled escalation potential. In Islamabad’s view, this ambiguity degrades crisis stability. Once such systems are dual-assigned, both conventional and nuclear, the firebreak between limited war and strategic exchange becomes blurred.
In a future operating environment increasingly shaped by AI-assisted ISR and NC3 systems, such ambiguity becomes perilous. AI systems, designed to reduce human latency in threat identification and response, would struggle with discerning intent. If a dual-capable missile is launched, the system would not determine whether it carries a conventional or nuclear warhead. Speed then replaces judgment, increasing the risk of misclassification and triggering automated or pre-delegated retaliatory decisions, especially when sensor-to-shooter cycles are compressed beyond human override.
This is not speculative. In 2022, India claimed that its BrahMos “accidentally” landed in a Pakistani city, a novel incident between two nuclear powers. Whether the 2022 incident was accidental, inadvertent or form of operation signaling remains unclear. At that moment, Pakistani restraint prevailed because Islamabad’s response was guided by human deliberation, situational awareness, and strategic patience. Should AI-assisted NC3 systems replace such decision-making processes, that restraint can no longer be assumed.
Read more: Implications of the Shifting Global Order
For preserving strategic stability, I argue for doctrinal and operational decoupling of nuclear and conventional systems, but such pledges would be impossible to verify in an environment where India even shuns engaging in dialogue with Pakistan. Absent such separation, BrahMos is not a stabilizing asset, it becomes a vector of miscalculation, particularly in a maritime crisis where detection timelines are short and ISR saturation is high.
A Crisis of Assumptions
There is a deep doctrinal asymmetry in South Asia, not only in capabilities but in how escalation is conceptualized. India’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, recently remarked, “There is a lot of space before that nuclear threshold is crossed… The most rational people are those in uniform when conflict takes place.” In my view, this assumption that escalation can be choreographed by precision strikes and professional judgment misreads both Pakistan’s doctrinal logic and the compressed geography of the region.
Pakistan does not define thresholds merely by domain or presumed proportionality, but by the nature of the target, cumulative signaling, and the strategic context. Maritime strikes, particularly those targeting dual-use or critical infrastructure, would likely be interpreted through this prism and result in asymmetric escalation. This asymmetry of interpretation creates a credibility trap. India believes it can manage escalation with remote precision and rational signaling; Pakistan is compelled to respond to deter it. Unlike Cold War scenarios, South Asia lacks time, distance, or crisis buffers. Capital cities and strategic installations lie minutes apart. When paired with AI-enabled ISR, dual-capable platforms, and hypersonic timelines, the scope for preemption increases and the room for miscalculation narrows.
General Mirza, Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, has cautioned that “the threshold of an escalatory war has come dangerously low… [South Asia’s] trajectories will shape the security architecture not only for this region but for the world.” In Pakistan’s view, strategic stability must rest on recognition of mutual red lines, not on a belief that technology or doctrinal opacity can insulate escalation.
Closing the Gap: Pakistan Navy’s Role
While Pakistan’s naval footprint is modest, India’s maritime exposure, spanning 7,500 km of coastline and clustered assets, makes it vulnerable to disruption and sea-denial during wartime. Former DG of SPD General Kidwai oft calls such environment as “target-rich.” CSGs are inherently exposed during forward deployments in the Arabian Sea, where surveillance and response times are compressed.
Additionally, India’s seaborne energy supply routes, critical for sustaining wartime operations, remain within Pakistan Navy’s operational reach, especially during crises. From a Pakistani perspective, these asymmetries provide opportunities for sea denial and disruption, potentially offsetting conventional imbalances elsewhere.
Indian policymakers, notably during the May 2025 episode, appear to be exploring the maritime domain for coercive maneuvering below the nuclear threshold. Yet this carries its own risks, particularly with the induction of dual-capable systems like BrahMos. Its speed, range, and ambiguous payload potential render it a destabilizing platform in a crisis. For Pakistan, this necessitates both active and layered defenses, as well as doctrinal signaling to deter its use and limit assumptions of escalation control.
Pakistan’s Navy may be smaller in size, but in strategic calculus, mass is not always decisive. Traditionally focused on sea denial and coastal defense, Pakistan’s naval doctrine would retain dynamism in responding to India’s shift toward maritime coercion underpinned by alliance-enabled capabilities and dual-use systems.
Instead of matching numbers, Pakistan Navy focuses on restoring deterrence equilibrium and may surprise Indian Navy by its responses. India’s integration of BrahMos cruise missiles into naval platforms under SFC; alongside six SSBNs, large inventory of intercontinental range SLBMs, advanced ISR and anti-satellite systems; is designed to bolster its strategic autonomy and possible nuclear pre-emption. From Pakistan’s vantage point, such developments expand the potential strike envelope across the Arabian Sea, affecting not just South Asia but a wider arc extending to China, Russia, Middle East, Europe and even the U.S.
By contrast, Pakistan does not have SSBNs and has not armed its conventional submarines with nuclear-capable Babur missiles. Still, Pakistan retains a credible second-strike capability through alternative delivery platforms. Asymmetry could push either side toward early use: the side with confidence in survivability may choose pre-emption; the side fearing loss may act first to overcome a “use-it-or-lose-it” dilemma.
Rather than mirror India, Pakistan’s Navy will deny escalation control at sea. Sea-based deterrence only stabilizes when mutual vulnerability is acknowledged. In 2019, by tracking and sparing an Indian submarine, Pakistan signaled that sanctuary at sea is illusionary.
Facing India’s trajectory, Pakistan should prioritize survivable ISR platforms, unmanned underwater vehicles, mobile coastal batteries, and quieter submarines. It should also field hard-kill options to blunt standoff threats, such as long-range anti-ship missiles and layered air defense for critical maritime infrastructure.
If India exploits doctrinal gaps at and through sea, Pakistan will close them with clarity, capability, and credible ambiguity. Maritime deterrence must now be an integrated strand of national security logic, not a bolt-on component.
Indian Navy’s Quad Integration
India’s maritime strategy has evolved beyond national force projection; it now blends deterrence signaling with alliance scaffolding under the Indo-Pacific strategic framework. The May 2025 crisis served as a live rehearsal for this shift: within 96 hours, a CSG was deployed in the North Arabian Sea. This marked another real-time use of maritime posturing alongside a continental conflict with Pakistan. In my view, Indian Navy was not merely demonstrating readiness; it was executing coercive signaling through forward maritime posture. Pakistan Navy’s restraint prevented escalation. Foreign assets, merchant ship traffic were present in this overlapping zone. In future, Pakistan Navy would be compelled to respond by expanding its maritime posture.
India’s naval modernization is not occurring in isolation. Its integration with Quad partners, through Malabar exercises, intelligence cooperation, platforms and forces interoperability, is shaping a distributed maritime capability. U.S.-supplied P-8I Poseidons, Japanese assistance in anti-submarine warfare, and real-time data-sharing under the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement extend India’s surveillance and targeting reach.
Although officially aimed at China, this elevation affects South Asia’s crisis dynamics. It blurs the line between national and allied assets. In future scenarios, if India were to initiate ISR-enabled strikes or forward posture submarines near Pakistan’s coastline, Islamabad would likely perceive it as a multi-vector challenge i.e. technological, doctrinal, and geopolitical.
Pakistan views this as a structural transformation. Former Naval Chief Admiral Bashir, warned that maritime autonomy risks becoming technological compulsion, where decisions are shaped more by platform integration than sovereign discretion. The concern is not just India’s expanded reach, but the political insulation it may perceive due to allied proximity.
This year, President Trump intervened to help ceasefire, reasserting the U.S. role as third party broker of peace. Unlike past dyadic confrontations, maritime escalation now risks entangling third parties. A Pakistani response to Indian maritime provocation could inadvertently affect U.S., Japanese, or Australian assets operating in the same domain. The ambiguity of cueing, mission ownership, and ISR source creates not just operational fog but strategic danger. Paradoxically, India spurns third parties brokering resolution of Kashmir dispute while entangling them militarily. This marks not just maritime modernization, but entanglement, embedding external actors into a bilateral conflict.
Conclusion
India’s shift toward maritime-led coercion introduces new variables into an already fragile deterrence equation. Unlike prior air or land crises, future conflicts may unfold in contested waters where third-party military assets operate, ambiguity is higher, and time for discernment is shorter.
From my perspective, India believes it can control escalation by shifting domains, relying on precision, public messaging, and alliance-derived confidence. Yet that belief underestimates the role of perception, misperception, and compressed timelines in South Asian crisis dynamics. Deterrence is not a product of geography alone.
Instead of seeking parity, Pakistan Navy’s evolving posture will deny escalation control and maintain equilibrium through selective modernization and ambiguity. The May 2025 crisis offered a preview of this: signaling was deliberate, thresholds were invoked, and restraint was exercised, but under conditions that may not be reproducible. India’s strategic impatience has been evident in Pulwama (2019) and Pahalgam (2025), where attribution preceded investigation. Such orchestration puts the burden of restraint on Pakistan.
As maritime operations become central to India’s strategic signaling, the burden of clarity will fall not only on New Delhi but on its partners. If Indian assets operate with allied cueing and ambiguous rules of engagement, they complicate deterrence instead of reinforcing it. In this environment, when perception drives projection, misjudgment becomes catalytic.
The next India–Pakistan crisis may not begin on land, and it may not be short. The Arabian Sea could become a corridor of consequence, giving way to miscalculation no side intended, but none could stop. Escalation in today’s crisis environments unfolds in compressed timelines, challenging conventional assumptions of gradualism. The speed at which both nations might climb the escalation ladder may leave global actors, including the U.S., with little time to intervene.
Brig (R) Dr Zahir Kazmi is the Arms Control Advisor at the Strategic Plans Division.
