In the highly polarized global political environment, the probability of nuclear weapons testing is increasing day by day. The only multilateral regime ever established to halt all types of nuclear weapon tests, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), has not entered into force due to political differences among major nuclear weapons states (NWSs). Nuclear tensions among major NWSs are continuously growing and could compel these states to resume nuclear weapons testing. In the first quarter of 2024, the Doomsday Clock already signaled a grave risk to the end of humankind, the highest risk ever signaled. Even security analysts are predicting that most of the NWSs may resume nuclear weapons testing as the environment is highly polarized and plausible. The following analysis looks at some of the evolving geo-political developments that may lead to resumed nuclear weapons testing and proposes a multilateral approach for dealing with the rising threat of nuclear weapons testing.
Most importantly, the US, Russia, and China have established new testing sites comprised of underground tunnels. All three of these countries are modernizing their nuclear arsenals in a way that requires hot testing for validation of the design. Simultaneously, tensions between them are at the highest level since the Cold War. The US-Russia arms control regime is already breathing its last, while US-China arms control talks have remained unfruitful. The suspicion and mistrust are at different levels that could initiate a round of nuclear weapons tests with the aim of political signaling.
Interestingly, in 2020 the Trump administration held dedicated discussions on whether to conduct nuclear tests or not. In the backdrop, there have been accusations that China and Russia are conducting secret underground tests of low yield nuclear weapons. Trump administration was also viewing these tests as a useful point for bringing China and Russia to the table for negotiations. These allegations have, so far, been denied by both countries but the US still believes that China and Russia are doing so. Also, the International Monitoring System (IMS) systems deployed across the globe lack the capability to detect tests of low-yield weapons tests. Now, trump is again re-emerging as a strong candidate from republicans and also enjoys a popular American support.
If Trump is elected as President, he could resume nuclear testing on the premise of various alleged concerns over Russia and China. Similar steps can be taken by Russia under the pressure of the Ukraine conflict, and it has also recently withdrawn from CTBT. Moreover, the US has recently conducted subcritical nuclear weapons tests at the Nevada nuclear testing site. This could be the first test of a series of forthcoming tests. Although this test lacked a self-sustained chain reaction, it still helped the US enormously in advancing its weapons model and designs.
Similarly, a dangerous situation is arising over the Korean peninsula. North Korea has recently tested an underground nuclear drone in response to joint military exercises conducted by the US, Japan, and South Korea. DPRK has also tested a missile in response to the US concerns over North Korea selling arms to Russia. This pattern clearly illustrates that the more the US engages in the region against North Korea’s interests, the more will be the chances of North Korea testing nuclear weapons. North Korea is already facing severe sanctions from the West for its nuclear weapons tests of 2016 and 2017 as well as a deadlock on the diplomatic front. North Korea may presume to have only one viable option to put pressure on the West which is nuclear weapons tests.
Likewise, the situation in South Asia also seems deteriorated further, where there are reports suggesting that India may go for thermonuclear tests while building the narrative that it failed to achieve the desired yield of thermonuclear devices in 1998. India is also engaged in developing new weapons designs and delivery platforms including the recently tested Agni-5, Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) capable missiles. To validate modern weapon system designs, India may opt for further nuclear tests. Pakistan maintains an official position that it will not initiate nuclear testing in South Asia. However, if India resumes such tests, Pakistan will also respond in kind.
It is high time to recognize the interconnection between geopolitical problems and nuclear policies. Thus, NWSs must utilize diplomatic channels to address geopolitical incompatibilities within and across the regions. This would automatically help in reducing the trust deficit among NWSs and simultaneously reduce the possibility of nuclear testing.
Moreover, all NWSs have declared unilateral moratoriums on nuclear testing despite the non-ratification of CTBT by some of those states. Therefore, there is a pressing need for a multilateral approach. All NWS should declare a joint moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, like the one declared in 1958. NWSs could declare a joint halt on all types of nuclear testing only for one year. Then this moratorium could be extended to a further one year or even more years. It will establish some degree of trust between actors.
A clause could be added to the agreement regarding a halt on the upgradation of current nuclear weapons testing sites and a total ban on developing new sites with stringent compliance and verification mechanisms. Moreover, if a slightest of unusual activity is observed at any county’s existing nuclear sites, then there should be an established communication channel like a hotline between major powers like Moscow, Washington and Beijing to immediately deal with the situation instead of all states going for nuclear tests. Over time, these steps could lead to the eventual ratification of CTBT.
Lastly, civil society has played a central role in appraising the masses and projecting anti-nuclear testing sentiments. Different civil societies of NWSs could place the importance on moratorium for each state through events, and seminars and collaborate to jointly pressure their respective governments to establish a joint moratorium on nuclear testing. For instance, Pakistan has, time and again, put forth a proposal for a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing which India rejected. Indian civil society could put pressure on India to accept this moratorium which is still on the table.
With the geopolitical tensions heating up globally, there is a dire need for trust and confidence building to bring together NWSs on nuclear non-testing. If a state resumes testing, there are high chances that more will follow, thereby, the world could witness a new push for nuclear arms race. Hence multilateral approach would not just avert the threat of nuclear testing rather it will develop trust among actors which would be instrumental in future arms control negotiations.
Fakhar Alam is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad.
Samran Ali
Mr Samran Ali is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
