The last quarter of 2023 witnessed a round of US-China arms control negotiations aimed at strengthening risk reduction measures rather than reducing arms. Such an arrangement could mitigate the crisis and uncertain situations simmering bilaterally between them and in the global geopolitics arena. So far, the discussions have yet to produce any solid results, and the parties have agreed upon no follow-up talks date.
As the US National Security Strategy 2022 had identified China as the “sole competitor” with the intent and capacity to reshape the international order in favor of its interests, these talks could serve as a first step for the future arms reduction regime between the US and China.
This analysis highlights geopolitical realities shaping China’s perception and eventually influencing America’s efforts to freeze competitive strategic advantage it enjoys over China by engaging it in a bilateral or trilateral arms control framework that includes Russia.
The US has been claiming that China has been building its fissile material stocks and that Beijing’s nuclear weapons delivery capabilities have been increasing. It has also claimed that China has done subcritical nuclear weapons testing.
Conversely, China’s top concern has always been the nuclear warhead’s number disparity vis-à-vis the US. As per the latest unofficial statistics, China possesses around 400 warheads, far less than the US, which possesses more than 5400. Resultantly, China views repeated American concerns for arms control as a tool for strategic advantage and an attempt for containment of Chinese nuclear capabilities.
The US also alleges that China has the fastest growing and non-transparent nuclear weapon program. The US Department of Defense report claims that by 2035, China will develop more than 1500 warheads; thus, transparency is needed. Meanwhile, China has responded to American reports as speculative and presumptive. Beijing Further asks America to look into its own massive nuclear weapons stockpiles, which are the highest in the world.
Additionally, China cannot ignore the fate of previous major arms control treaties, especially between the US and Russia. The cases in point are how America abrogated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and dealt with the New Start Treaty after the Ukraine conflict. Washington’s attitude towards those arrangements has compelled China to think twice before negotiating any arrangement, specifically when the agreements aimed at addressing uncertainty in crisis were the cause of more chaos during a crisis – as observed in post-Ukraine conflict developments.
Moreover, the lessons from the Russia-Ukraine conflict are also shaping the threat perception of Beijing and would make it further difficult for it to engage in arms control initiatives. China cannot ignore the fact that NATO could stand with Taiwan if any confrontation happened in the region, similar to its support for Ukraine. Even though Taiwan is part of China and has no formal relations with NATO, the member states of NATO still held their first dedicated discussion over Taiwan in September 2022. During these discussions, NATO members threatened China that “it should remain aware of the possible ramifications if a military action is taken against the island.”
At the G7 summit, UK’s PM, Rishi Sunak stated “China poses the biggest challenge of our age to global security and prosperity.” Even the French National Strategic Review 2022 identifies China as the main competitor and raises concerns regarding China’s growing global engagement. Also, these NATO nuclear members, along with Germany, Canada, Italy, and Japan, at a G-7 meeting, criticized China for its nuclear modernization, claiming that it was free from substantial arms control initiatives in the form of strategic reduction measures. The underlying question is, could China go for arms control with the US without engaging with NATO?
Simultaneously, agreements like AUKUS and Quad, which have geo-political implications for China, also impact Chinese assessment regarding Washington’s aspirations for an arms control arrangement. At one point, China is repeatedly asked for nuclear CBMs by the US. On the other hand, it is exploring more means to entangle China in the region. Under these conditions, it is difficult for China to trust the US as a sincere partner in talks to restore global peace and stability. The US-China bilateral relations have become further complicated, and discussions for regulating nuclear matters, which were hardly taking place, are further delayed.
China also cannot ignore the indirect American support and backup to India’s nuclear weapon program – particularly after the Indo-US nuclear deal. Through it India could use its domestic uranium only for weapon purposes and divert imported uranium for peaceful purposes. American National Security Strategy (2022) states that India is a major defense partner and that India would defend “interests mutually” in the region. Moreover, a report published by Belfer Center illustrates that India is on the way to developing the world’s fastest-growing nuclear weapon program. Under these conditions, Beijing can conclude any risk reduction measures with Washington without addressing the issue of India in its neighborhood.
Both China and the United States must work to break the current deadlock by minimizing mutual mistrust. It is time to break the vicious cycle of suspicion between the two countries. The US and China could initially work on risk reduction measures. They can subsequently address the issue of nuclear disparity and transparency. The geopolitical realities of AUKUS and Quad must also be tackled – the issue of NATO’s nuclear members and India must be made part of the discussion. Establishing transparency, verification mechanisms, and a commitment to strategic restraint can also build confidence. Lastly, considering lessons from past treaties, a pragmatic approach is necessary to pave the way for a comprehensive arms control regime, fostering global stability and peace.
Fakhar Alam is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad.
