AUKUS, is a trilateral maritime security partnership of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States focused on enhancing defense and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. It is aimed at bolstering Australia’s naval capabilities by facilitating the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. AUKUS also prioritizes collaboration in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and other advanced defense sectors. The alliance strategically aims to counter China’s increasing influence in the region. Initially not open to expansion, AUKUS expressed its willingness to increase the membership in June 2023, particularly on the technological front, with the condition that prospective members bring substantial technological contributions centered on Pillar II. Japan is considered eligible for membership in an extended AUKUS with India also under discussion, albeit with some disagreement.
The concept of Pillar II aims to foster technological innovation and ensure that member nations can collectively respond to emerging threats and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. It is designed to complement the first pillar, which focuses primarily on military capabilities, particularly the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines by Australia.
The inclusion of India in the AUKUS alliance is portrayed as a response to the escalating global rivalry between the United States and China. While India has welcomed the AUKUS pact as a deterrent against China, joining the alliance would likely require New Delhi to adjust certain foreign policy positions. On one hand, for maintaining its strategic autonomy New Delhi wants to avoid aligning with an overtly anti-China coalition. On the other hand, proponents argue that AUKUS offers India the flexibility to engage with China on terms that are favorable to New Delhi.
From New Delhi’s perspective, AUKUS signals Washington’s strong commitment to addressing security challenges posed by Beijing. By breaking the long-standing taboo on sharing military nuclear propulsion technology, the U.S. shows a willingness to adapt new strategies to counter China. For many in India, this mirrors the transformative U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative under the Bush administration, which aligned the strategic interests of both countries. AUKUS is thus an expansion of nuclear cooperation aimed at achieving broader strategic goals in the Asia-Pacific that started after the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005. The iCET agreement, signed in January 2023, further underscores both India and America shared concern over China’s influence and strengthens a foundation for cooperation in cybersecurity, AI, and other critical fields. Though collaboration under Pillar II is not yet established, successful engagement under the iCET could lay the groundwork for deeper integration within the AUKUS framework, aligning both nations’ long-term objectives and subsequently leading to discussions on nuclear submarine technology. This framework positions India as a key player in the U.S. Indo-Pacific policy allowing the U.S. to harness India’s as an ally to counterweigh China.
If India isn’t included in AUKUS or an expanded version, it might strengthen ties with France or Russia for greater “strategic autonomy.” However, this could strain U.S. interests in the region and its partnership with India. A delicate balance is illustrated by instances like CAATSA, where the U.S. made exceptions for India, such as allowing the purchase of Russian S-400 technology and the 2005 nuclear waiver. The U.S. is likely to find ways, directly or indirectly, to accommodate India’s interests through informal collaborations. Therefore, whether India becomes part of AUKUS or not, it can carve out a win-win situation for itself at the expense of rules-based order.
Following AUKUS, France which termed the trilateral alliance as a ‘stab in the back’ has also pledged deeper defense ties with India, potentially offering the Barracuda-class SSN design with a 190MW pressurized water reactor. If realized, India could acquire its first nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and enhance its ballistic missile submarines with advanced propulsion. Further, Ashley Tellis, a defense analyst, has also proposed “INFRUS” deal involving India, France, and the US. India and France have a history of submarine agreements, including the Scorpene-class under Project 75. India also operates the Russian Akula-class submarine Chakra II and INS Arihant and Arighat nuclear-powered ballistic submarines, bolstering its warfighting and reconnaissance capabilities in the Indian Ocean. Hence, the rapid indigenous military modernization and access to naval technologies can enhance the naval strength of India.
However, a critical examination of India’s potential inclusion in AUKUS highlights that New Delhi’s membership is far from guaranteed, as it carefully assesses the likely reactions from China, Pakistan, and ASEAN. The addition of India to AUKUS could significantly impact Asia’s security landscape and contribute to the growing divide between strategic blocs globally. Whereas on one hand, the AUKUS has got Australia “off the fence” and “locked in” the country for the next forty years into cooperating with the U.S. in a theatre of its choosing, thereby limiting its strategic autonomy. This erosion of autonomy, however, is precisely what India would want to avoid, as New Delhi has long been resistant to joining military alliances. Maintaining strategic independence remains a cornerstone of India’s foreign policy, a position it continues to assert despite changing regional dynamics.
Nevertheless, India is keen to expand its role in the region, which explains its participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) alongside the U.S., Japan, and Australia. However, India remains undecided on its stance regarding military action in the Taiwan Strait. India’s engagement in Pillar II of AUKUS seems more feasible than direct involvement in Pillar I. However, if the developments and technological collaborations forged ahead through Pillar II and foster significant advancements and trust between the member states, particularly the U.S. and India for which the groundwork has been laid through the iCET agreement, discussions about sharing nuclear submarine technology may follow. In other words, the advancements and collaborations developed through Pillar II could lead to for further integration into the AUKUS framework, potentially leading to discussions about nuclear submarine technology. This would significantly impact the security landscape in Asia and contribute to the growing divide between strategic blocs globally. India’s long-standing commitment to strategic independence will continue to guide its approach, but the dynamics surrounding AUKUS present a unique opportunity for India to enhance its naval capabilities and strengthen its partnership with the U.S. in a manner that supports its broader strategic objectives of becoming a regional hegemon.
Sibra Waseem
Sibra Waseem is pursuing undergraduate studies in Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad. Her areas of interest include geopolitics and military strategies.
