Youm-e-Takbeer Special | Nuclearization of South Asia

After the US nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) to both state and non-state actors became an important challenge for the international community. However, even with the major powers’ signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), a landmark agreement that is the centerpiece of global non-proliferation efforts, the first major blow to the treaty came from South Asia when India conducted its first nuclear test on 18 May 1974. “Operation Smiling Buddha” was the code name given to India’s first nuclear test, yet India called it “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion.” With this test, India virtually led South Asia towards a nuclear arms race, which continues to remain a dominant feature of Indo-Pak relations. India’s so-called “peaceful nuclear explosion” represented the first documented case of nuclear proliferation following the signing of the NPT.

However, the overt nuclearization of South Asia began when India, yet again, conducted a series of nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. Within two weeks of Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan had to demonstrate its own nuclear capability on May 28 to maintain regional strategic balance. Since the overt nuclearization, the relationship between the two nuclear rivals has been shaped by the ever-present danger of a military conflict escalating to nuclear brinkmanship. Today, Pakistan and India are poles apart in their respective approaches towards arms control measures.

A critical question that needs examination here is why, over the span of 24 years from 1974 to 1998, the international community failed to curb India’s nuclear ambitions. It’s equally worth pondering on why the P-5 states couldn’t persuade India to accept important proposals put forward by Pakistan, including the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. Despite the fact the international community’s unanimity of thought on issues related to nuclear proliferation, India not only continued its nuclear weapons program, but it also overtly demonstrated its capability in later years. India’s aggressive pursuit of its nuclear capability leads us to the conclusion that some of the relevant members of the international community, throughout history, have largely turned a blind eye to India’s nuclear developments.

It is noteworthy that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a group of 48 countries that contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of specific guidelines for nuclear exports, was created in response to the Indian nuclear test of 1974. Its primary purpose was to keep countries like India out of global nuclear exports. However, the creation of the NSG alone was insufficient to deter India from advancing its nuclear capabilities. The global nuclear powers, particularly the US, failed to implement stringent measures against India’s nuclear weapons program.

On the other hand, Pakistan was indeed a reluctant nuclear power. Pakistan offered several proposals, including a proposal for a South Asian NWFZ, to the UN General Assembly in November 1974. In addition to NWFZ, in 1979, Pakistan offered proposed renunciation of the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and India as well as comprehensive mutual inspection of each other’s nuclear facilities and the simultaneous mutual acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) “full-scope safeguards.”

One of the most important proposals that came from Pakistan was the simultaneous accession to the NPT in 1979. India did not accede to any of these measures. While India’s blatant refusal depicts its arrogant attitude, the international community’s lack of acknowledgement of Pakistan’s proposals was another area of concern. In fact, global nuclear-haves’ indifferent attitude towards Pakistan’s security concerns and its proposals helped India to carry on with its nuclear weapons developments.

Interestingly, when Pakistan reciprocated the Indian nuclear tests, Indian parliament member Somnath Chatterjee condemned India’s tests and directly addressed the then-Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. He said, “You have started a nuclear arms race in this region.” It appears that even the sane voices in India were aware of the fact that their country’s constant refusal of Pakistan’s proposals further destabilized the delicate regional balance. When the international community blamed India for setting off a nuclear spiral in the region, Vajpayee yet again rejected it.

After 26 years of overt nuclear weapon tests, there exists fragile and, to some extent, insufficient nuclear confidence-building measures between the adversarial neighbors. Both rivals have repeatedly failed to develop and upgrade existing CBMs to meet future challenges. In fact, with time, South Asia’s strategic stability has become more uncertain and fragile.

For instance, on 9 March 2022, India, as per its official stance, inadvertently launched its nuclear-capable BrahMos supersonic cruise missile into Pakistan’s Mian Channu. However, given India’s aggressive posturing under PM Modi’s rule, it appears that it was, most likely, a deliberate targeting of Pakistan during peacetime to gauge the latter’s military preparedness. In the absence of a reliable communication channel for crisis management, such an incident can lead the entire region towards nuclear brinkmanship.

After twenty-six years of nuclear learning, Pakistan and India must develop some kind of mechanism to facilitate bilateral confidence-building measures. For that, India needs to revisit its neighborhood policy. Its hawkish and aggressive behavior towards Pakistan has left no space for open dialogue. Therefore, given the nuclearized environment, such an attitude further adds to mistrust and fuels regional instability.

Yasir Hussain

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