On 16 November 2024, India tested its long-range hypersonic missile from Dr. APJ Kalam Island off the cost of Odisha. According to the press release by Indian Ministry of Defense, range of newly tested hypersonic missile is greater than 1500 km and can carry various types of payloads. Moreover, the press release states that the missile is for the Indian Armed Forces – all three services of the Indian military. Other specifications of the missile include a diameter of 1.4 meter, length of 14 meters and weighs less than 20 tons. According to the reports, payload of the missile suggests that it was a delta winged body hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and not a hypersonic cruise missile (HCM). The development of hypersonic missile is consistent with the evolving Indian counterforce strategy. It also showcases the increased focus of India on expanding its missile capabilities to bolster both accuracy and maneuverability to evade adversarial defenses. In the Indo-Pak equation, they are not a game changing technology. However, their development can have certain implications for its relations with Pakistan and on the security of the greater Indian Ocean region.
Hypersonic missiles are defined as those missiles that have a speed more than Mach 5 – five times the speed of sound – can travel within the earth atmosphere at this speed and have a higher maneuverability. There are two different kinds of hypersonic missiles, one is hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and the other is hypersonic cruise missile (HCM). HGV’s are delivered by a rocket booster like other missiles but can achieve a speed of at least 5 Mach. They are different from ballistic missiles not because of their speed but their maneuverability after being released from the rocket. This ability of the missile makes it difficult to intercept and defend against. The recent hypersonic test of India was an HGV. HCM, on the other hand, uses ramjet or scramjet engines for achieving hypersonic speeds. They are terrain-hugging missiles flying at lower altitudes (20-40km) evading radar detection. India is also working on the development of HCM, as they tested hypersonic technology demonstrator vehicle (HSTDV) in 2019.
Hypersonic weapons are not a game changer in the India-Pakistan security equation. Both states share a more than 2000-mile-long border and there is already a very short missile flight time from one to the other. For example, BrahMos missile – launched inside Pakistan by India in 2022 – travelled 124 km in Pakistan at a speed of 2.5 to 3 Mach for 3 minutes and 46 seconds. A hypersonic missile would travel the same distance at approximately 1 and a half minutes, converting decision-making time from two proverbial blinks to one. Moreover, Pakistan has not pursued a ballistic missile defense programme and its nuclear posture is not that of winning nuclear war but only deterring it. The focus of Pakistan is only to deter any kind of Indian aggression at both conventional at strategic levels.
The development of hypersonic technology by India can still have certain implications on Pakistan’s security perceptions and regional stability. There have been concerns in Pakistan regarding counterforce strategy of India that can adversely affect crisis stability between India and Pakistan. Regarding their implications, hypersonic weapons can provide India with an enhanced capability to conduct precision strikes during a crisis. They can be used to target nuclear command and control centers, conventional or other strategic assets using a conventional payload i.e. without breaking the nuclear taboo. In short, the use of long-range conventional hypersonic missiles during a crisis can further increase the risks of nuclear use in the region.
In the contemporary nuclear age, the threat of attack by non-nuclear strategic weapons (NNSW) like hypersonic missiles has emerged as a crisis escalation risk. NNSW are those weapon systems that are below the nuclear threshold but can have decisive strategic effects. This is because these weapons can target or engage the targets of adversary at the strategic level while bypassing both tactical and operational levels. Indian hypersonic missile has a range greater than 1500 km, means it could attack any location in Pakistan. The use of hypersonic missile below the nuclear threshold on Pakistan’s command and control structure, strategic bases, missile silos or other assets would force Pakistan to reply in kind. This new technology, if employed during a crisis, can lead to serious escalation further lowering the threshold of nuclear war.
India is also focused on using the new hypersonic missile in an anti-ship role. This would provide India with the greater capability to strike ships in the Indian Ocean region from a longer distance and with more precision. This is in line with the India thinking of taking the IOR as its own backyard, and its ambition of being a net security provider in the region. However, it can undermine the freedom of navigation for maritime purposes in the region. IOR has the busiest sea lines of communication making it a very important junction. This development can further militarize the IOR with other states also taking steps to protect their interests in the region. These steps include the development and deployment of advanced military assets in the region.
In short, Indian development of hypersonic missile has negative implications on crisis stability and arms race stability in the regional equation between India and Pakistan. Moreover, there would also be security ramifications at the broader IOR level because of the introduction of hypersonic technology in the region.
Mr Abdul Moiz Khan is Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
