Trump 2.0 has put Europe’s feet to the fire on defence spending. The recent directives to halt and review all military aid to Ukraine has created a heightened sense of urgency as Trump intensifies pivot to Asia-Pacific and accelerates efforts to scale back American involvement in Europe. The proposed mineral agreement in Ukraine has further exposed the transactional nature of the new U.S. administration’s foreign policy, signalling that security guarantees may now come with stringent economic conditions. The message for Europe is clear: it must either translate ideas of strategic autonomy into action or prepare for diminishing U.S. security commitments without offering strategic incentives or financial compensation in return. This begs an important question: Will pursuing strategic autonomy compel Europe to reconsider the nuclear umbrella long upheld by Washington?
A History of Strategic Inertia
Strategic autonomy has been a long discussed, yet futile endeavour in European discourse. The idea first gained momentum in the 1990s, particularly after the Balkan Wars exposed Europe’s military dependence on the U.S. This led to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999, but progress was limited due to financial constraints and concerns about undermining NATO. Outlined by then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the 3Ds—Duplication, Discrimination, and Decoupling—reflected American fears that EU defense efforts would compete with NATO rather than complement it, reinforcing Europe’s misgivings about pursuing genuine military independence.
Despite the growing ambition for strategic autonomy, European defense spending remained inadequate throughout the 2000s and 2010s,with most NATO members failing to meet the 2% GDP defense target. Even after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, European efforts like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) produced little tangible progress. The EU Strategic Compass (2022) was a more concrete step toward strengthening European security, but key military capabilities and nuclear deterrence still rested firmly within NATO, keeping Europe tethered to U.S. security guarantees.
The advocates of strategic autonomy in Europe may feel vindicated in view of the Trump administration’s abrupt tilt towards Russia, a policy that was in action since 2022, after the start of hostilities in Ukraine. The meeting of high officials from both sides in Saudi Arabia without the presence of European allies signalled American intent to settle the war on terms that were in its favor, but not Ukraine’s. However, to fully grasp this shift, it is essential to understand Donald Trump’s vision of the world order.
Trump’s Foreign Policy Reset
Trump’s second term has ushered in a decisive break from the post-WWII consensus on U.S. foreign policy, reviving a pre-war mindset where European security was not an American priority. His administration sees Washington’s extensive military commitments as an unsustainable burden, pushing for a recalibration that prioritizes domestic and Asia-Pacific interests over entanglements in Europe. The growing burden of multiple global engagements—ranging from Ukraine to the Middle East—has only reinforced concerns about strategic overextension, especially as China continues to rise peacefully.
At the center of this shift is Trump’s attempt to redefine U.S.-Russia relations. The push for economic engagement with Moscow, including potential economic and investment deals, is a calculated effort to weaken the deepening Russia-China partnership. This transactional approach, which ties security commitments to economic interests, has unsettled European allies, raising difficult questions about the future of NATO and America’s role in European defense.
The suspension of military aid to Ukraine following a tense Oval Office meeting with President Zelensky underscores this new reality. Trump’s foreign policy is moving away from open-ended commitments, demanding that allies contribute more—whether through strategic resources or financial compensation. For Europe, this moment is critical: it must either step up and take ownership of its defense or risk being sidelined in an evolving global order where U.S. security guarantees are no longer unconditional.
The Nuclear Question
Trump’s transactional approach to security has reignited European discussions about nuclear deterrence. If U.S. extended deterrence can no longer be taken for granted, can Europe rely on France and the UK to fill the void?
Germany appears to be ruminating openly. On February 21, Friedrich Merz, Germany’s anticipated chancellor, expressed interest in exploring nuclear protection agreements with London and Paris. In response, French President Emmanuel Macron has reaffirmed that France’s nuclear deterrent has a European dimension, an idea that was previously met with reluctance in Berlin and other European capitals.
However, integrating France and the UK’s nuclear capabilities into a collective European deterrence faces numerous political, strategic, and operational challenges. The first and most fundamental question concerns the overall vision: Should a ‘Eurodeterrent’ function as an extension of NATO, reinforcing the existing transatlantic alliance? Or should it take the form of a new, independent initiative that includes both the UK and EU member states while operating separately from NATO?
Additional challenges arise from the fact that neither France nor the UK has an explicit nuclear guarantee extending beyond their own national security interests. Moreover, the UK’s nuclear arsenal remains closely tied to the U.S. through its Trident missile system, raising legal and logistical questions about whether it could be fully integrated into an independent European defense framework.
Beyond technical considerations, the question of political trust and strategic alignment remains unresolved. Countries like Poland and the Baltic states have traditionally viewed the U.S. nuclear umbrella as irreplaceable, given its superior capabilities and deeply embedded role in NATO’s deterrence structure. A shift toward a Franco-British umbrella would require European nations to place unprecedented confidence in Paris and London’s willingness to use nuclear weapons on their behalf, a commitment that has not been fully tested. Additionally, there is no clear mechanism for shared decision-making on nuclear use, unlike NATO’s existing Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which gives non-nuclear European allies a voice in deterrence strategy.
These structural challenges suggest that while the idea of a European nuclear umbrella may be gaining traction, turning it into a functional reality will require significant diplomatic negotiations, legal restructuring, and increased defense integration.
The Risk of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Yet, pursuing a collective nuclear deterrent is arguably a more viable option than risking independent nuclearization by European states. If trust between Germany and nuclear-armed European allies like France and the UK erodes, Germany might consider advancing its nuclear capabilities. Similarly, Eastern European nations, facing perceived threats and lacking confidence in collective security arrangements, could contemplate independent nuclear options. The recent treatment of Ukraine, particularly the challenges it has faced despite international assurances, may reinforce such inclinations. The Budapest Memorandum of 1994, wherein Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances, has been highlighted during recent NATO discussions, underscoring concerns about the reliability of such guarantees.
A Defining Moment for Europe
Trump’s second presidency has forced Europe into an uncomfortable reckoning with its security dependencies. If Europe is serious about strategic autonomy, it must move beyond rhetoric and take concrete steps toward defense integration.
This means increasing defense spending, expanding military capabilities, and most importantly, developing a credible nuclear deterrent that does not hinge on Washington’s political mood swings. A Franco-British nuclear umbrella is an option, but it will require overcoming deep-rooted political, strategic, and operational barriers. Failure to act will leave Europe vulnerable not just to external threats, but also to internal divisions that could spiral into a proliferation of nuclear capabilities. The choice is clear: unify and strengthen collective deterrence or risk a fragmented and unstable security future.
Urwa Adeen is an independent researcher with a Bachelor's in Strategic Studies from National Defence University with an interest in nuclear command and control, strategic stability, and foreign policy.
