Introduction
On 17th July 2025, India conducted tests of its nuclear-capable Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) Prithvi II and Agni I, launched from the integrated test sites at Chandipur, Odisha. The Strategic Forces Command oversaw the missile tests. According to their claims, the tests fulfilled all operational and technical parameters. These missiles had previously been tested, meeting similar operational but with less technical standards at that time, and were also intended to target deep inside Pakistan. However, the retesting is a signaling by India regarding its capability to communicate a perceived credible threat and response, particularly in the aftermath of the recent Indo-Pakistan conflict. This leads to the question: Does the retesting indicate a shift in doctrinal posture? The following analysis presents the technical parameters of the retested Prithvi II and Agni I. It also examines India’s increasingly aggressive posture, which is characterized by improving missile capabilities, departure from its stated doctrinal positions, and deliberately moving to counterforce options.
Testing and Specifications
Prithvi II, inducted in 2003, has a range of approximately 250-350 km. It has a payload capacity of 500-1000 kg, which can carry both conventional and 15-20 kiloton (Kt) nuclear warheads, air-fuel explosives, and submunitions. The most significant feature is the improvement in internal casting and on-site fueling, which takes two hours for a cold start. This enables ready-to-launch capability during crises. The guidance system has been upgraded with ring-laser gyroscopes, expected to provide operational accuracy and precision with a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of less than 40 m, compared to the previous 100 m.
Similarly, Agni I was inducted into service in 2007. It is a single-staged missile with a payload capacity of approximately 1000 kg and a range between 700-1200 km. This can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads with a capacity of 45 kt and submunitions. Its internal casing has been enhanced, and it is equipped with canisterisation, ready to launch from a Transporter Erector Launch Vehicle (TELv). The guidance system incorporates a micro-navigation correction integrated with RLG-INS (Ring Laser Gyroscopes-Inertial Navigation System), retrofitted from advanced Agni missiles to enhance accuracy and targeting. This integration enables post-thrust navigation during the missile’s unpowered mid-course and terminal ballistic trajectory, reducing the CEP to approximately 25-40 m.
Lowering the CEP enables more precise counterforce targeting and the use of lower-yield warheads to minimize collateral damage. This could alter regional risk patterns, as improved accuracy makes a potential counterforce targeting option more feasible. Although the canisterization provides mobile readiness, allowing for rapid response, it also enhances the survivability, stealth, and strategic ambiguity of the delivery system. The canisterization and lowering of CEP lead to two possible scenarios. First, India may be further enhancing its multi-layer targeting options, ranging from tactical to strategic strike capabilities. Secondly, its failure to achieve objectives during the four-day conflict, combined with even minor CEP issues, may have prompted a shift towards targeting dispersed or wide-area objectives.
Post-Conflict Regional Dynamics
Given the heightened situation during the post-87 hours conflict between India and Pakistan, the timing of dual tests carries immense significance. India is rapidly developing its missile arsenal, combined with irresponsible and inaccurate statements from their political leadership regarding the recent conflict. During the conflict, the region experienced a deadly confrontation between two nuclear-armed states, with extensive use of emerging technologies, rockets, drones, and missile systems to reach deep inside enemy territory. For the first time in nuclear history, the sovereignty of a nuclear-armed state was openly violated during an active conflict. India remained provocative and offensive during the conflict. However, Pakistan’s response was calculated and defensive; instead of further escalating and provoking the conflict, it aimed to restore strategic stability. Furthermore, responding to India’s option of a limited strike, Pakistan has introduced a quid pro quo plus (QPQ+) strategy. QPQ+ is based on quality and measured conventional response, and an assertion that India would not be allowed to consider Pakistan’s capabilities as a bluff.
Both Agni I and Prithvi II are designed to target Pakistan’s major military bases, command nodes, and logistic infrastructure. This reflects India’s so-called “dissuasion by punishment” doctrine by maintaining conventional counterforce targeting options without provoking the NFU doctrine. However, this presents a dangerous abstraction that highlights evolving nuclear strategies. Indian NFU pledge reflects a doctrinal façade where, on one hand, it pledges to the NFU policy, on the other, its modernization and force posture reflect a move towards nuclear first use. This is endangering the region by turning deterrence into an act of coercion in an already fragile nuclear environment. However, India wrongly projected that it triumphed over Pakistan during the 87-hour conflict, which is disinformation, as Pakistan responded through its QPQ+ strategy, after which India backed down. This also exposed Indian conventional operation inferiority vis-à-vis Pakistan. Hence, the so-called conventional advantage India claimed over Pakistan uncovered a lack of coordination and warfighting capability within the Indian military. Therefore, the justification for retesting the missile highlights an over-reliance on nuclear deterrence by enhancing its missile arsenal and maintaining the option of counterforce targeting during a crisis.
South Asian Strategic Stability
Indian leadership is struggling with the delusion of being a great power. India and Pakistan have divergent goals: while India aspires to attain great power status, Pakistan seeks to maintain strategic stability in the region. New Delhi’s great power ambitions are fueled by its domestic Hindu nationalist narrative, which drives the regime’s warmongering and aggressive policies. In addition, India’s technological edge, growing economy, and rapid military modernization further reinforce its pursuit of great power status. Additionally, missile development gives India the option for counterforce preemption. This conflicts with their NFU policy and contradicts their official nuclear doctrine. It further creates crisis instability, and a potential doctrinal shift is expected through lowering the crisis threshold and undermining the deterrence stability in the region.
Furthermore, integrating advanced technologies into missiles is considered a risky maneuver that is shaping a new security landscape in South Asia. Pursuing greater precision and accuracy in missile technologies reflects an ambition for Indian counterforce preemption during crises. The rationale behind miniaturization and reducing CEP is to ensure a diversified, multi-layered weapon arsenal, ranging from short-range to long-range strategic weapons, readily available for launch. Such capabilities could even trigger a “use it or lose it” dilemma for an opponent due to the short distances and limited time for decision-making. Hence, Indian nuclear and military modernization with canesterization of missiles is detrimental to strategic stability between India and Pakistan.
Conclusion While risk reduction and bilateral dialogues remain challenging, strategic development is essential to counterbalance the emerging Indian threat. There is a strong need for confidence-building measures, especially after the development of technologically advanced weapons that allow precise and large-scale destruction. The missile development in South Asia is not a new chapter, but after the recent conflict, India is rapidly further modernizing its conventional and nuclear arms. This shows changes in Indian strategic thinking and its behavior. Even using a conventional missile to target strategic objectives could be seen as triggering a nuclear-weapon state to respond. India’s canisterisation and reduced CEP indicate first-strike ambitions, endangering Pakistan’s deterrence stability. However, strategic stability becomes harder to achieve and maintain when political objectives intersect with the regional security dynamics, as in the case of Hindutva ideology influencing the South Asian strategic stability. This leaves a little room for the talk process between two nuclear-armed states.
Mr Saad Riaz is a Research Fellow at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.
